Securing the nuclear nation

In 1946, in the Southern Urals, construction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics first plutonium plant fell to the GULAG-Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (NKVD). The chief officers in charge of the program – Lavrentii Beria, Sergei Kruglov, and Ivan Tkachenko – had been pivotal figures in the deportation and political and ethnic cleansing of territories retaken from Axis forces during WWII. These men were charged with building a nuclear weapons complex to defend the Soviet Union from the American nuclear monopoly. In part thanks to the criminalization and deportation of ethnic minorities, Gulag territories grew crowded with foreign nationals and ethnic minorities in the postwar years. The NKVD generals were appalled to find that masses of forced laborers employed at the plutonium construction site were members of enemy nations. Beria issued orders to cleanse the ranks of foreign enemies, but construction managers could not spare a single healthy body as they raced to complete their deadlines. To solve this problem, they created two zones: an interior, affluent zone for plutonium workers made up almost exclusively of Russians; and anterior zones of prisoners, soldiers, ex-cons, and local farmers, many of whom were non-Russian. The selective quality of Soviet “nuclearity” meant that many people who were exposed to the plant's secret plutonium disasters were ethnic minorities, people whose exposures went unrecorded or under-recorded because of their invisibility and low social value.     

朝鲜半岛安全问题及中国与有关各方的合作策略

自朝鲜核试验到最近的"天安"号事件,朝鲜半岛及东北亚安全形势发生重大变化。问题的解决涉及多方甚至整个国际社会。中国应妥善处理中美关系,加强中、日、韩三国间的互信、共识与合作,加强与俄罗斯及国际社会的沟通与合作。在坚决促朝弃核,推进半岛无核化的同时以经济外交为杠杆促朝融入国际社会,在寻求外交谈判解决半岛危机的同时,做好应对半岛可能出现的突发事件的准备。     

东北亚国家安全体系:从双边困境到多边合作的安全路径分析

作为经典国际安全理论的安全困境理论无法充分说明后冷战时代东北亚区域国家安全状态。无论从体系引导型安全困境亦或国家引导型安全困境,都难以找到东北亚各国安全战略差异产生的根本原因。东北亚各国间的安全互动已经形成了一个超越安全困境并以美国为核心的地区国家安全体系。通过对东北亚国家安全体系结构和流动性安全要素的考察可以发现,各国安全战略的不同与其在国家安全体系结构中的位置和对流动性安全要素的控制能力密切相关。这有助于进一步探寻东北亚国家间安全关系从双边困境到多边合作的路径。     

从东北振兴迈向东北亚大同:试论东北振兴计划与“中韩港”合作

全球化时代的东北振兴不仅具有重要的中国国内经济发展意义,还有重大的国际和地区战略意义,"中韩港"三边合作,对于从东北振兴迈向东北亚大同,具有举足轻重的作用。自上个世纪90年代以来,朝核问题成为影响东北亚和平稳定的主要因素,在六方会谈框架下,中韩双方在维护朝鲜半岛以及东北亚局势的稳定方面积累了合作的经验,两国的经济联系也日益密切。在2008年金融危机背景下,中韩经济均受到不同程度的冲击,中国需要通过拉动内需防止经济发展势头中断,韩国和中国香港特区也需要寻找新的增长空间,而东北振兴计划能够为解决上述矛盾找到出路。中国东部跨越、中部崛起、西部开发都离不开东西和谐、南北合作。"中韩港"在振兴东北问题上的合作如果奏效,有利于吸引更多的国际资本流向该地区,从而为该地区的稳定繁荣打下进一步的基础,为通向东北亚大同创造必要的条件。     

US state crimes related to nuclear weapons: Is there hope for change in the Obama administration?

Given the long history of US state crimes related to nuclear weapons and the aggressive unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration that compounded these crimes, the election of Barack Obama created a “hope” for “change” in American nuclear weapons policy. While it is too early to render any conclusive judgment, we offer a preliminary assessment of the Obama record with regard to nuclear weapons based on a number of significant policy statements made and official actions taken, including Obama's 2009 Prague speech, the signing of the new START agreement in April 2010, the administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Washington DC Nuclear Security Summit, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference of 2010. Although the new administration has taken some steps to reduce the likelihood of the use or threat to use nuclear weapons, we conclude that under President Obama the US continues to be in violation of the solemn legal obligation to disarm as imposed by the NPT treaty of 1968. We also briefly note some of the structural and cultural factors related to the American empire that hinders any president from changing American nuclear weapons policy.     

SNRPN基因rs220030位点的分型及甲基化亲缘相关性

目的建立变性梯度凝胶电泳(denaturing gradient gel electrophoresis,DGGE)技术与焦磷酸测序技术对小核核糖核蛋白多肽N(small nuclear ribonucleoprotein polypeptide N,SNRPN)基因rs220030位点的分型方法。建立应用焦磷酸测序技术分析CpG甲基化状态的方法,探讨rs220030位点用于亲缘等位基因判定的可行性。方法应用DGGE技术对97例上海地区汉族家系血样rs220030位点进行分型,同时应用焦磷酸测序技术对其中25例血液来源的家系样本的rs220030位点分型,并对两种方法在SNP分型结果上进行比较。通过重亚硫酸盐修饰联合焦磷酸测序技术分析随机2组家系样本rs220030位点上游CpG甲基化状态,判断甲基化是否有亲缘相关性。结果经DGGE检测97例家系血样rs220030位点分型结果为C纯合子20例,T纯合子29例,C/T杂合子48例。经焦磷酸测序检测25例血液来源的家系样本结果与DGGE检测结果一致。经重亚硫酸盐修饰联合焦磷酸测序技术分析,2组血液来源的家系子代的rs220030位点上游CpG甲基化状态均与母亲较相似。结论相比DGGE技术,焦磷酸测序技术更精确、方便,适合大样本、高通量SNP分型。重亚硫酸盐修饰联合焦磷酸测序技术可以精确分析CpG甲基化状态。rs220030位点可用于亲缘等位基因判定。     

A Nuclear-Free Middle East – Just Not in the Cards

A scheduled conference to promote a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has renewed hopes for nuclear disarmament in this unstable region, if only innovative diplomacy could take advantage of the current shifts. However, a realistic assessment suggests that optimism is unwarranted. Fundamental strategic considerations related to Iran's nuclear program, Israel's atomic options, and the region's ingrate security architecture remain nearly insurmountable hurdles. Therefore, policymakers should focus first on attaining a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     

NATO,ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

Abstract

Within the next few years, NATO will need to make a collective decision about the future of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe. While opinion about the value of these weapons is not as split as conventional wisdom might suggest, and while NATO will remain a nuclear alliance irrespective of this decision, balancing politics and strategy looks likely to be a difficult task. This decision is made far more complex by the determination of NATO officials to link the withdrawal of these weapons to reciprocal reductions in Russian TNW in Europe, and by the possibility of substituting the key strategic and political link they provide with a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. This article shows how we have arrived at this position, highlights the potential benefits to NATO Europe of BMD, and considers the key questions that the Alliance will face in achieving this. Ultimately, this article shows how the future of TNW in Europe is likely to be linked to whether NATO values arms cuts with Russia, or the deployment of missile defenses, as its central priority.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

Globalization and the Korean electronics industry

Abstract

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved.